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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The actual session title is "Innovative Approaches to Irrigation Water
Conservation". This session is further qualified by stating that two
representatives of local organizations will be describing how their organizations
encourage more efficient water use.
B. The conference participants need to understand that the Northwest Kansas
Groundwater Management District board of directors has to date only committed
to eventually implementing a program designed to improve water use efficiency
throughout the GMD. Nothing has yet been done. The board's developing
approach is unique in that they are committed to a short-enough time frame that
they have already eliminated the possibility of approaching the goal by the more
traditional methods of education and demonstration. The board's aggressive
posture comes from their belief that early conservation is significantly more
valuable than late conservation. So in response, their dilemma seems to be: How
can GMD 4 most effectively achieve significant water use efficiency
improvements in as short a time as possible?
C. The board began looking at approaches that would effectively drive all
irrigators to efficiency up-grades. They eventually want to explore all alternatives,
including the use of positive incentives, disincentives, regulation, and any other
method that has the potential to bring about the aggressive rate of efficiency upgrades desired. The following are three very different alternatives explored thus
far, each covered in a moderate level of detail only.
1) MANDATING A MINIMUM IRRIGATION APPLICATION EFFICIENCY
a) Water in Kansas is a public resource, appropriated by the state
for private use so long as that use is in the public interest and is
reasonable and not wasteful. The first step of this option is to redefine "public interest" and "reasonable and not wasteful use" for
our local GMD in terms of a new minimum standard of water use
efficiency.
b) The board must first set, by enforceable policy, a minimum
irrigation water use efficiency to take effect at some reasonable
time in the future. They are considering an 85 percent minimum
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efficiency to become effective 5 years from the policy's passage
date.
ci Once the policy requires a minimum irrigation efficiency, a
procedure needs to be developed to rate all existing systems against
that minimum standard. Those systems that do not have the design
capability to meet or exceed the minimum standard are to be
notified and will have up to the. enforceable policy deadline to either
up-grade, stop irrigating, or enroll in the state's water rights set
aside program.
di For any systems physically incapable of up-grading, three
alternatives (other than the obvious alternative of abandoning the
water right) will be offered so that they too can participate in the
goal of lessening irrigation water use. They will be obligated to
either: (1) voluntarily reduce their existing inefficient water right to
that amount of water that would be needed if the crop was to be
irrigated at the minimum 85% efficiency level; (2) purchase
irrigation efficiency credits on the open market from neighboring
irrigators; or (3) enroll the right in the state's Water Right
Conservation Program.
e) To insure that system management decisions maximize the
system's designed efficiency capability, annual water use reports
(derived from required flow meters) will be evaluated to determine if
the system was effectively operated during the year. Any
owner/operator that reports using 110% or more of the crop's
calculated net irrigation requirement will be expected to justify that
additional usage during a follow-up conference. Usage that cannot
be justified during these extra sessions will either be required to
attend irrigation schooling, be docked a pre-set quantity of next
year's water right, be published by name and amount of water used,
or some other suitable reward.
f) It will also be important to prohibit water rights from adding
additional acres after increasing their irrigation efficiency.
Otherwise no water savings will result, which is the goal of the

process. Fortunately this has just been accomplished by the state
who on February 11, 1993 has placed a moratorium on such
acreage additions.
g) The concept of marketing irrigation efficiency credits should
enhance the attainment of the goal by providing an additional tool
for the irrigators. Basically this will allow individuals who cannot upgrade to get with individuals who want to up-grade but cannot
afford to do so. By purchasing an appropriate number of efficiency
credits, the buyer provides capital so that the seller can exceed the
minimum standard by a like amount. Together, they at least
average the minimum efficiency standard. This concept, when
applied to water, probably needs some modification, though.
Efficiency credit transactions will need to be restricted in both time
and space, and re-sales will probably need to be prohibited. Also
the GMD will need to be the coordinating broker for all such
transactions - not setting price, but simply monitoring sales and
purchases.
h) Finally, the addition of an economic disincentive could prove
additionally valuable. The board is also considering a 5-fold increase
in the district's water user charge (assessment). The additional
money raised could be used to cost-share on underground pipe and
other incidentals necessary for converting to pivot sprinkler or higher
irrigation technology. This added financial help, contributed by the
irrigators as a group, should help the effort along even faster.
2. REDUCING WATER RIGHTS FROM WITHIN AN INTENSIVE
GROUNDWATER USE CONTROL AREA (IGUCA)
a) Another way to bring about water use efficiency is to limit
district water rights to only that amount of water needed by
efficient systems for the acres and crops irrigated. This is a very
direct way to reduce water withdrawals, and has precedent because
this is essentially how the state approached the Walnut Valley water
supply problem (Cheyenne Bottoms).

b) The irrigators then individually decide whether they want to
reduce irrigated acres and continue watering less-than-efficiently,
invest in system efficiency improvements and continue irrigating all
current acres, or change cropping choices. As with the first
proposed program, adding acres to existing water rights cannot be
allowed and flow meters are a must. Also, increasing the water
user charge to create a more reasonable "cost-of-water" should be
considered.
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c) For our GMD to accomplish this, we would first have to establish
an IGUCA. Once this is done, we would recommend to the state
engineer a set of corrective control policies that would reduce all
existing water rights to efficient quantities of water. Adjusting all
irrigation water rights to quantities of water necessary for 85% or
90% irrigation application efficiencies would reduce water
withdrawals while leaving most of the decisions to the producers.
d) At this time it would also be possible to re-schedule the reduced
rights such that they could have a 5-year allocation rather than an
annual allocation. This would allow for additional flexibility for the
water users in dealing with abnormal rainfall periods.
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e) The drawbacks to this approach are:
(1) Under Kansas law, once a local GMD petitions the state
for an IGUCA, all decisions are turned over to the state and
there are no direct provisions in the law to discontinue an
IGUCA., This process is not well received by the local district
members who see it as an opportunity for the state to regain
much groundwater management control. As such it may not
be politically feasible:
(2) There are no guarantees that any appreciable number of
irrigators will invest the up-grade capital needed to continue
irrigating the same acreage and growing a similar level of
production. If few do, the area still reduces its water use,
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but also reduces a substantial portion of its irrigated economy
as well.
3. PHASING OUT JUNIOR WATER RIGHTS BASED ON PRE-SET
HYDROLOGIC TRIGGERS
a) Another direct way to achieve pumpage reduction is to phase out
the appropriate number of junior water right holders, at the
appropriate times. This alternative can be designed to achieve any
goal desired - from reducing declines by 15% over the next 50 years
all the way to completely halting water level declines in just a few
years time.
b) Step 1 of this concept is to divide the GMD into Management
Areas (MA) based on some logical sub-unit (legal township, small
hydrological basin, well density areas, or other) and decide on a
methodology for obtaining water level data. Accurate water level
data are important in establishing all triggers critical to this process.
Our board is considering a legal township as constituting a MA, and
allowing the well owners within the MA to either accept the existing
mapping and monitoring data for water levels in their MA, or pick a
minimum of 5 existing wells which they agree to annually measure
and report.
c) Each MA would next be assigned a "buffer depletion value"
based on its starting saturated thickness. This value would dictate
when regulation would begin. A weighted formula would be used
((Ave Q) (.00075)) to determine this value so that the full range of
saturated thicknesses across the GMD are more fairly considered.
This formula means that a MA with an average saturated thickness
of 60 feet would get 3 feet of additional decline following program
start-up, before regulation begins. A MA with 125 feet of water
would get 11.7 feet of additional decline before regulation begins.
d) This buffer depletion value (interim trigger) is the MA's call for
local action, and when viewed in terms of the MAs annual decline
rate, will give the water users of that MA an indication of when

regulation would begin. It is to the MAs advantage to self-regulate
at this point in time in order to reduce area water level declines to
the lowest rate possible. The GMD will provide management
assistance to any MA wanting to make such an attempt at selfmanagement, but will not officially get involved until the buffer
depletion decline has been realized. If this initial trigger is never
reached, no regulation would occur. However, once the interim
trigger is reached, each MA is then classed based on its average
annual decline rate. Class I MAs would be those with average
decline rates less than .5% per year based on the previous 3-years
data. Class II MAs would be those declining between .6% and
1.75% per year. Class III MAs would be those declining faster than
1.75% per year.
e) Township goal quantities would next be determined for each MA
depending on how that MA is classed. The formula would be: (Ave
St2) X (class factor). Class I MAs would get a more lenient goal
quantity (class factor of .0025) while Class III MAs would get the
most stringent goal quantity (class factor of .0018). The goal
quantity is an expression of how much water is going to be pumped
out of the MA before junior rights are prohibited from pumping in
order to protect senior rights (water table stabilization). The larger
the class factor, the larger the MA goal quantity.
f) The long-term recharge amount would then be apportioned to the
most senior rights as far as it would go - thus determining the set of
sustainable, senior rights. Next the entire goal quantity would be
divided up among the non-sustainable right holders in 20 percentile
groups - the first 20% group (most senior of the non-sustainable
rights) would get 30% of the goal quantity, the next 20% group
would get 25%, the next 20% group would get 20%, the next 20%
group would get 15% and the last 20% group (most junior) would
get 10% of the goal quantity.
g) The non-sustainable water right goal quantities are then
converted to acrefeet quantities for each water right. This amount
is then that right's portion of the allowable withdrawal based upon
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its seniority and hydrologic location. With each right now having a
specific acrefeet of water allocated to it, from here on out it
becomes an accounting process simply deducting each year's use
from the remaining account balance until all of the allocated water is
pumped. In years where the water table does not decline within an
MA, all water use would be exempted from the accounting process
for that year. Also, the board is currently proposing a minimum
individual well quantity that would provide at least 10 years of
continued pumpage for all water rights. Under the actual proposal,
there are junior rights that would be prohibited from pumping in as
little as 3 years.
h) Other side-programs would also be expected to be run with this
alternative. Mandatory metering, for example, would be a necessary
activity for the water right accounting process. Also a more strict
administration of existing water rights laws (tailwater control,
overpumpage, abandonment for non-use) would be advised in order
to maximize program efficiency and equity. Finally, increasing the
water user charge to effectively create a cost-of-water should also
be considered.
i) This option, as presented, would result in an average of 78% of
the GMD's current saturated thickness remaining when all final
triggers were reached and all junior water rights were finally
regulated. Regulation would begin as early as 10 years and would
not completely cease until, in a few cases, 150 years later.
This option provides:
(1) Three separate incentives for the local water users to
reduce declines to their lowest possible rates as early as
possible: (a) before their MA reaches the regulation trigger;
(b) At the time their MA is classed (lower classes get a better
goal quantity); and (c) because any year during regulation
that the water table does not decline, the accounting
procedure is suspended.
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(2) An ability to save ones allocation for future use or sale.
It does not promote the "race to the well" scenario that
would be a significant negative factor in all other programs
that are driven by a "systems" or "trigger" approach.
Additionally, once each right is quantified, the owner
immediately realizes the finality of his or her non-sustainable
rights. This will undoubtedly result in significant personal
conservation decisions.
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(3) An ability to establish any final goal level locally desired.
By adjusting the factors and formulas the water levels can be
stabilized at any level desired. In other words, the program
can be designed as aggressively or passively as desired.
(4) A Method whereby existing water right priority is taken
into account. The more senior non-sustainable rights in any
MA end up with a larger share of the MA goal quantity.
k) Applied Example:
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o an nual decline rate = 1 .0 fa
The Buffer depletion value would = (80 2 (.00075) = 7.5' of
additional decline before regulation began. At an annual
decline rate of 1 ft/yr. the MA could expect 7-8 years of
continued pumpage before any policy implications.
At the buffer depletion trigger, with a decline rate of 1.0%,
the MA would be classed as a Class II MA, and would at that
time have 92.5 feet of saturation remaining.
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The Depletable quantity would then be set based on the MA
being a Class II MA. It would equal (60 2 (.002), or 17.11
more feet of decline. This final decline goal of 17.1 feet
represents 59,130 acft, which is the amount of water that
would be allowed to come out of the entire MA before all
non-sustainable (junior) pumpage would be prohibited and the
water table would stabilize.
Based on 1083 acft of long-term annual recharge
(sustainable water rights) and 7000 acft of total water rights
appropriated in the MA, there remains 5917 acft of nonsustainable water rights that must share the depletable
quantity of 59,130 acft.
The 1st 20% of the 5917 (1183 acft) would get 30%
of the total, or 17,739 acft;
The 2nd 20% (1183 acft) would get 25% of the total,
or 14,782 acft;
The 3rd 20% (1183 acft) would get 20% of the total,
or 11,826 acft;
The 4th 20% (1183 acft) would get 15% of the total,
or 8,869 acft; and
The 5th 20% (1183 acft) would get 10% of the total,
01 5,913 acft.
The final step would be to convert each water right into a
total quantity. To do so, each group's total acft quantity
needs to be divided by their percentage of the nonsustainable quantity to obtain a group multiplier.
1st 20% group would get a multiplier of 15.0 (17,739/1183)
2nd 20% group would get a multiplier of 12.5 (14,782/1183)
3rd 20% group would get a multiplier of 10.0 (11,826/1183)

4th 20% group would get a multiplier of 7.5 (8,869/1183)
6th 20% group would get a multiplier Of 5.0 (5,913/1183)
If an individual had a 200 acft water right that was in
the first 20% group of the non-sustainable rights, he
or she would then be allocated a total of 3000 acft of
water (200 x 15) for their total use - to use or save as
desired. This would represent their share of the total
depletable quantity, based on their specific
hydrological circumstance and relative priority date to
other water rights in the MA.
EARLY MANAGEMENT IMPACTS
If the above sample MA got serious and slowed their decline rate to
.5 ft/yr early in the process (while still in the buffer depletion stage)
they would get classed as a Class I MA and would end up with
73,958 acft to share. This would in turn result in the 200 acft
water right above getting a multiplier of 19, or 3,800 acft of water.

V. SUMMARY
A. Even though nothing has yet been done officially by the GMD board to
mandate improved irrigation water use efficiency, local water users have begun to
react to the possibility of local action. For example, the conversion rate from flood
to sprinkler since the issue first began to be publicly discussed has increased fairly
dramatically - in excess of 10,000 acres being converted each year over the past
three years. The only down side to this increased conversion rate thus far is that
much of it has been converting one flood quarter to two pivot circles, resulting in
more irrigated acres with the efficiency increase and little if any reduction of
water usage. Fortunately, as discussed earlier, this has been corrected for us with
the recent state moratorium on adding new land to existing water rights.
B. It must also be recognized that regardless of how the board ultimately decides
to bring about increased water use efficiency, this issue represents only one of
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several programs the board is planning on designing and implementing in order to
solve the decline problem with as little economic and social disruption as possible.
Unless the board opts for the hydrologic trigger method (option 3), there is no
single answer to the declining water level problem. And even if they do opt for
this method, applying other programs that will reduce pumpage will likewise
forestall triggers and translate into a less onerous regulatory program as proposed.
C. Finally, it may seem that the GMD is singling out irrigation users for the
regulatory fix, but all use types will eventually be addressed. The fact that 97.7%
of our annual usage is irrigation seems to compel the board to start there.
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